Several recent articles discuss the Sa’ada war and bring up religious demographics and explore if there is a sectarian dimension to the war. First of all, lets note that there are several sects of Zaidism and the residents of Sa’ada are largely Jarudis, to distinguish them from other Zaydis (the Batriya, the Salihiya and Sulaymaniya).
As Global Security notes, Zaidis are “moderate” in that “The Zaidis do not believe in the infallibility of the Imams, nor that they receive divine guidance. Zaidis…believe it can be held by any descendant of Ali. They also reject the Twelver notion of a hidden Imam, and like the Ismailis believe in a living imam, or even imams. In matters of law or fiqh, the Zaidis are actually closest to the Sunni Shafie school.”
It is my impression, and Im sure someone in Yemen will correct me if Im wrong, for which I am quite appreciative, that within the moderate Zaidi school, the Jarudis are the most inclined to require a Hashimi leader, within the broader acceptability of a “just” leader.
Two recent articles define Hashimis in relation to the Saada War. First is an article about the Sa’ada War in the Middle East Times that critiques an earlier Washington Post article. The MET article correctly states that the war is a political conflict with both sides using external bogey men to gain international support. However, that article describes Yemen’s leadership as Zaidi, not entirely true, as Ali Mohsen who is leading the war effort is a convert to Wahabbism and surrounds himself with hard core Salafis. And the Yemeni regime itself gave the war sectarian overtones, for example by calling the rebels and sympathizers “Satanic”, issuing Fatwas, burning religious books, banning mainstream religous ceremonies (al-Ghadir day) and harassing Hashimites based on their religion. The regime’s Houthi paranoia has reached new heights and anyone with a grudge can get their enemy arrested by leveling a charge of Houthism.
The most significant fact of the Sa’ada war is, was and remains the regime’s collective punishment of the civilian population, including random bombardment, arbitrary arrests and the withholding of food, medicine and international aid. The withholding of food and medicine to 700,000 civilians in Sa’ada is a practice the regime sometimes openly defends, othertimes obscures as required by “security concerns”. Yemen’s donors have made statements about the humanitarian disaster in Sa’ada, calling for a resolution that allows aid to the region, however aid organizations are still stymied.
The EU called on the Yemeni government to do “all it can to ensure that innocent civilians are not caught up in the conflict”….Based on the assessment of needs and access to victims, the EU remains ready to consider urgent humanitarian assistance to victims, including the worrying number of internally displaced people.
The EU voiced the belief that only a political solution can achieve lasting peace, and called on all parties to show restraint and to work actively towards a negotiated settlement along the lines of the February 2008 agreement. “The stability of Yemen is crucial for the people of Yemen and for the region as a whole,” the presidency said.
Mareb Press: “The US embassy in Sana’a said in the first comment about what is happening in Saada that resuming dialogue is the best solution for restoring peace in the government. The human and economic losses are great in Saada and the US thinks that dialogue is the best alternative choice, the independent al-Share’e Newspaper quoted the source as saying.”
Now to the second article, which notes the Houthis are 5′ers not 12′ers like Iranian Shia and, like the WaPo article, highlights both the media blackout and the humanitarian crisis. The region is under seige, the author correctly states, and the civilians have recieved very little attention internationally, which is partially due to the media black-out.
Yemeni Daggers Unsheathed
By RANNIE AMIRI
“If a cat dies in Lebanon, the world knows about it. Here in Yemen, we are forgotten.”
- Zaidi scholar Sayyid Mourtada al-Muhatwari
The jambiya or ceremonial curved, double-edged dagger worn under the belt of Yemeni men after age 14 conveys both the status and clan of the person wearing it. It may be harmlessly drawn during traditional dances but only in rare and exceptional circumstances would it ever be used as a weapon against another. Sadly, this is essentially what is happening in the fratricidal war taking place in Yemen, one of the Arab world’s poorest countries. It is a war that has gone largely unnoticed yet one that clearly exposes the political and sectarian fault lines emblematic of similar conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.
The uprising in Saada, a governorate located in the mountainous highlands of northwest Yemen along the border with Saudi Arabia, began exactly four years ago. It was initially led by Zaidi cleric Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his Shabab al-Momineen (Believing Youth) movement against the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
To better understand this rebellion, a cursory knowledge of Zaidi and Yemeni history is helpful.
The Zaidiyyah school in Islam is considered an early offshoot of Shia Islam. Whereas the majority of Shiites believe that a finite line of 12 Imams succeeded the Prophet Muhammad, Zaidis assert that Zaid ibn Ali, after whom they are named, should have rightfully been recognized as the 5th Imam instead of his brother. More importantly, they contend the line of imams is ongoing and continues to this day. Any male who can trace their lineage back to the Prophet qualifies for the position (reports differ as to whether Hussein al-Houthi designated himself as imam). These Arab descendents of the Prophet are known as Hashimites.
(Read on …)
